irc said:
(10:37:26 AM) Darkened: Anyone who has the least interesting in BSOD feel free to give me 1d100.
(10:39:16 AM) Chibi-Reaper_: Hrm.
(10:39:24 AM) Chibi-Reaper_: roll 1d100
(10:39:25 AM) qqdice: Chibi-Reaper_ rolled 1d100: 100 = [100]
+5=105
The being stops moving entirely. It's arms fall to its sides o its side as it shifts it's position ever so slightly, moving into a pile of debris. In effect it becomes a statue, indistinguishable from the trash and debris. Such total stillness is easily adopted. Its every movement is voluntary and conscious. It lacks the automatic responses to a threat or instinctive urge to move that a being of flesh and blood might possess. This is the action of prey, to cease movement and hope they might blend in with the background, that larger hunters, expecting their quarry to run, will overlook such ploys.
The being ponders how it knows what it knows. It has no reference frame for concepts such as predator and prey in the minutes of time it has been active. Yet the being grasps such concepts and their associations; the wealth of connotation beyond the obvious denotations of such. Is this knowledge valid externally, fabricated? What does this say of the being that it possesses such data. As difficult as the implications are, the being elects not to set them aside for the moment. Contemplation and stillness go together. Distracting itself from the external world only serves to enhance its ability to remain still.
The being's analysis of its thoughts seem rational to it, though if its thoughts have been implimented it is imaginable they would have been done so in such a way as to seem rational. Eventually it settles on the notion that such chains of logic are inescapable. Even if it had memory the possibility that such memory was simply implanted would be equally valid.
For now, the being elects to continue thinking in its current fashion until such time as reasonable doubt emerges as to the validity of its inborn knowledge. However, the being finds itself unable to answer the question of how it might know what it knows. A crash interrupts the being's musings, something falling and a strangled noise. Then there is silence.
Electing caution, the being continues to wait. Clouds gather in the sky, and eventually it begins to rain, a light dismal drizzle. Water is not bothersome in its own right, but the being worries briefly that water may exacerbate its rusting.
Eventually the being moves. By its estimation approximately 7 hours have passed since it elected to wait and no further information regarding the noise has revealed itself since the crash. Grabbing its makeshift cane and hobbling clumsily across the rubble, it advances toward the pile as quietly as it can.
Against all odds, the being crosses the space toward where it first heard the noise without creating undue noise. Immediately the source of the noise becomes obvious: another being such as itself. A large sheet of metal protrudes from this new being's neck, and, aside from the occasional spark, it remains still. This ex-being is far smaller and lighter, quadrupedal in its form, though possessed of an oddly human face that contrasts with its shape. A sphinx, save for the lack of wings. The sphinx's limbs are more graceful than the being's; its smoothly curved pieces of metal designed to resemble life possess far more artistry than the being's blocky and rusted limbs. Its eyes—intricately constructed small lenses that protrude ever so slightly from its face—stare emptily into the being's face. There is no sign of movement or recognition.
The being easily surmises that the crash was the cause. The sphinx must have stumbled or tripped and brought a pile of rubble crashing down on itself. And so it died, alone, unmourned.
The being hesitates over that word. Death. If the the being and the sphinx are robots rather than cyborgs, can they even die? The concept of death presupposes life in the first place which presupposes a biological existence. Odd that the language the mechanical being knows is so fundamentally lacking in words to address the experience of artificial intelligence.
The being turns to abandon the sphinx when a notion strikes. It knows—in the same impossible way it knows such concepts as predator and—that it could consume the sphinx; that it could take in the dead thing and cannibalize its body for usable parts, repairing and enhancing itself.
The being knows that this is wrong; that this is an act of desecration. It is little different than if a human were to consume his own. Yet this knowledge is detached, analytical. There is no emotional sensation of wrongness, no cultural predisposition to assume that the moral judgement is valid rather than contingent to some unknown culture with which the being's knowledge originated.
[ ] Consume the bestial ex-being acquiring repairs and acquire:
-[ ] Optic enhancement?
-[ ] Mobility enhancement?
-[ ] Auditory enhancement?
[ ] Leave it?
[ ] Bury it?